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The US is in the midst of an extraordinary national debate concerning the appropriate policy mix with which to address the challenges posed by Iraq. The iterative presentation of the US Administration's approach to "settling" the Iraq question lends itself to measurement against a decision model that factors in policy ends, means, ways, constraints, opportunities, costs, and risks to determine if all critical variables have been considered and properly weighted in the US decision process. Using such a decision template, this paper will propose that the US approach to Iraq should focus primarily on curtailing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program through a sequential mix of coercive diplomacy and limited military force as required. Such an approach is most likely to achieve relevant US national security objectives while minimizing the US cost in lives and treasure.
INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT
An analysis of US decision-making must begin with the international environment in which the US operates. The defining feature of the international system is the US role as the only superpower. In comparative measures of wealth, the nearly $10 trillion economy of the US exceeds that of any competitor by a factor of two and US military outlays equal the combined total of the next eight largest defense budgets. (Nye, (35) (36) In broader terms, the prevalence of US commercial products overseas, the recognized preeminence of American universities, the use of English as lingua franca for international discourse, and US agendasetting in international fora all provide a reservoir of "soft power" to complement US predominance in economic and military measures of national strength.
But the statistical catalogue of US prowess has not permitted the US to exclusively set the ground rules for the global community. Translating indices of raw national power into equally large measures of influence globally is an imperfect process and particularly difficult if the exercise of that power is perceived as overly self-interested or heavy-handed, a charge leveled against the US with increasing frequency in recent years. The Ottawa treaty banning landmines, the Kyoto treaty on global warming, and the establishment of an
International Criminal Court are all examples of the potential for US preferences to be sidelined by an international consensus on issues of transnational importance.
These challenges to US authority do not signal an accelerating decline, but they do create diplomatic friction that has a measurable impact on the time and effort needed by the US to persuade states to support, or at least not obstruct, the US agenda on important issues such as crafting an acceptable UN Security Council resolution on Iraq. Ironically, US ambivalence toward full-fledged participation in various global institutions may have eroded
Washington's ability to turn to those bodies for support when it needs them (witness the damage to US credibility done by the running battle over UN dues' paying in recent years).
US reticence to accept rules, constraints, and institutional mandates has fed international concerns about a US predilection for unilateral action in its global dealings. A dismissive attitude toward the inputs of allies and partners or a failure to properly reward support from other states can eventually lead to resentment in important capitals (Moscow being a prominent case currently (Lewis, Overall, the international and strategic setting is a mixed bag for the US; Washington has amazing stores of political, economic, and military capital. But it must nurture a stronger sense of international community through dialogue and demonstrate a greater willingness to adjust timelines and policy tools to achieve a workable consensus on issues such as Iraq.
US HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
The US historical and cultural context is important because it forms the psychological scaffolding for the thought processes and policy approaches of US leaders. Key elements of the US context are the beliefs that: 1) wars are aberrations that should be prosecuted expeditiously to allow a quick return to the equilibrium conditions of peace and international cooperation ( McDougall, 213); and 2) America's borders, insulated by the strategic depth of two oceans, are inviolable and therefore wars are events that occur overseas, far from the US.
These guideposts of the American psyche have figured either directly or implicitly in the pronouncements of US political leaders since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Downplaying traditional conceptions of a clearly demarcated and linear conflict, the Administration has tried to reshape public expectations on the nature and timeline of this war and its relationship to everyday life. US officials have emphasized the likelihood of long periods of unobserved preparatory work punctuated by sharp bouts of violent action that could stretch into the indefinite future. (Powell, 18) The shadowy, protean nature of this struggle clearly poses a challenge to US leaders, who must continue to demonstrate measurable progress even when conventional indices of success are hard to produce.
The most dramatic shift in the US psychological landscape comes from an awareness of homeland vulnerability. The attacks of 9/11 stripped away the sense of distance and protection from mortal threats that the US has historically enjoyed in its continental vastness.
This discomfiting sense of vulnerability has and will have profound implications for how the US defends itself in the future.
During the last century, the US drew a distinct lesson from its painful experiences in two world wars; Washington recognized that it could not withdraw from the messy political and security issues convulsing the world but had to play a leading role in building the international architecture to collectively defuse those issues and thereby protect US security interests. A divergent lesson seems to have emerged in the aftermath of 9/11 -that the international architecture (e.g., the UN, World Bank, IMF, NATO) is now often too unwieldy in safeguarding US security against threats that emerge in the seams of the traditional nationstate system and that unilateral action, or more focused cooperation with selected states outside existing frameworks, is often the best and swiftest guarantee of national security.
The cumulative effect of these historical and cultural factors has been to create a powerful political imperative for the US Administration to take the offensive on security matters. As the case of Iraq demonstrates, the scope of such action is not limited to countering manifest threats but also extends to smothering latent ones. The train of logic leading to preemptive action has a strong resonance given the potential destructiveness of the enemy's weapons and al Qaeda's focus on US territory as the preferred battleground. The question remains whether this logic applies in the case of Iraq; whether the template for action devised for use against international terrorism is easily overlaid on the complex set of security issues knotted together in Iraq.
US STRATEGIC ENDS TOWARD IRAQ
Iraq has been a nagging security concern of the US for more than twelve years. Until 9/11, Iraq was a regional nuisance, worthy of close monitoring and occasional punitive strikes, but not a first order threat to the US. However, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the US, the Administration viewed Saddam Hussein through a new threat prism and constructed a rationale for seeking his removal from power by force. The prospect of such an alliance remains a possibility, but the ideological underpinnings of such an odd coupling would probably make it short-lived and volatile. Al
Qaeda is a radical Muslim fundamentalist group with a worldwide scope for its terrorist acts.
It has no territory to defend, no fixed assets to protect, and answers to no traditional political master. Hussein, on the other hand, is a very secular leader of a vulnerable state with pretensions to regional greatness and a pathological need to exert total control over people and assets within his grasp. It is highly improbable that Hussein would provide resources to al Qaeda so that it could launch attacks the timing and nature of which the Iraqi leader did not control, for an agenda that is ultimately inimical or irrelevant to his interests, against an overwhelming foe that is looking for a casus belli to remove him forcibly from power.
While an Iraqi-al Qaeda latch-up does not appear to be an imminent danger, Hussein's efforts to establish himself as a regional hegemon have not been abandoned, only The US Administration has asserted that Hussein intends to bridge the distance between his desiderata and his capabilities by acquiring a nuclear weapon. It is prudent to assume that Hussein is still pursuing a nuclear capability and that it would likely take from one to six years for him to achieve this goal depending on whether he smuggles in weaponsgrade uranium or must develop the infrastructure to produce it himself. (Gordon) While the US has a keen interest in preventing Iraq from acquiring a nuclear capability, it is worth asking what the possible consequences would be if Hussein did secure such a weapon.
The assumption of US political leaders is that Hussein's quest for a nuclear weapon is intolerable; from a practical policy perspective, that stance is a reasonable one in mobilizing international policing efforts to prevent Hussein from succeeding in this pursuit. However, the level of exertion and risks the US is willing to take to counter Hussein's nuclear efforts should be based on a clear-headed appraisal of how Iraq would likely use such a weapon to further its aggressive agenda. In Iraq's case, a nuclear weapon would be most potent in conjunction with conventional forces that had the capability to seize territory and confront opponents with a fait accompli. The gains from another successful invasion of Kuwait, for instance, could be protected under the umbrella of a declared Iraqi nuclear threat to dissuade the international community from attempting to restore the status quo ante bellum. The onus would then be on the US to court nuclear conflict by initiating a war to expel Iraq. At present though, Iraq does not possess the option of a surprise conventional attack because of US capabilities in the region and relatively meager Iraqi conventional forces.
The only other viable option for Iraq would be to declare its nuclear capability and then demand that it be granted control of Kuwait (or Saudi or Iranian oil fields). This blackmail scenario would be far less promising because it would place the burden on Hussein of carrying through on his threat when his demands were not fulfilled. Given that Hussein has no long-range delivery system, he would have to resort to smuggling the bomb onto the territory of another state that he seeks to hold at risk, which is not an easy proposition.
Making a nuclear threat or following through on such a threat would be an absolutely losing proposition for Hussein (and more importantly, Hussein would almost certainly recognize it as a no-win situation) for at least two reasons: 1) his expansionist designs would very quickly unite virtually all states in a severe response to Hussein's gambit; and 2) he would undoubtedly precipitate threats of total annihilation against him, his regime, and his country by the US and its closest allies. Hussein, despite his isolation, understands the prerogatives of power and has, in the past, recognized and followed the dictates of deterrence theory when confronted with the option of using lesser forms of WMD against opponents who possess superior capabilities. (Schwarzkopf) Hussein's highest priority is to ensure his own survival and so it is improbable that he would pursue a course that would almost certainly lead to his own destruction when dealing with nuclear weapons.
Hussein's most risky nuclear option would be to hand a bomb over to Islamic terrorists and cede to them control of the timing and location of an attack against the West.
Given the presumed scarcity of Hussein's nuclear resources in any future scenario and his penchant for absolute control, it is highly questionable that he would hand this precious instrument over to an unpredictable group whose agenda he does not control and whose actions would not directly further his near-term aims. In any case, he would be leaving himself open to the most severe retaliation because of the risk of nuclear materials being traced back to Iraq; a prospect Hussein would not consider inviting.
This analysis does not argue for complacency in thwarting Iraq's quest for a nuclear weapon, but does underscore the importance of realistically assessing how the political landscape and relative balance of power would shift if the US failed to prevent Hussein from acquiring one. The point to be made is that Hussein would face much greater risk factors should he attempt to use nuclear blackmail and his past behavior indicates that he is susceptible to the logic of deterrence when confronted with an overwhelming preponderance of opposing force.
Another factor that the US must figure into its decision calculus is the cultivation of better relations and a more positive image in the Arab and broader Muslim worlds. Arab perception of the West is refracted through a prism of culture, history, and religion that makes mutual understanding a daunting task. But the effort must be made to cast US policy as "Arab-friendly" because the stakes are so high and the consequences of further radicalized publics in the Arab world could be devastating for US interests. Arab cynicism concerning the US role in the Middle East neutralizes much of American hard and soft power and places stresses on Arab leaders who must increasingly balance their relations with the US against mounting internal pressure to address the frustration and anger toward Washington.
A major objective that has been discussed and debated intensely in recent months has been the aim of "regime change," removing Hussein from power in Iraq and installing a new leadership. As an explicit goal of US policy, toppling leaders, even those as unsavory as
Hussein, is fraught with complications in terms of international law, US political relations with the international community, and coalition-building for the war on terrorism. The concept of state sovereignty has been codified through the UN Charter and other international legal instruments as a barrier against capricious state-to-state interference and a hedge against the "anarchic" tendencies of the international environment.
But sovereignty is not an absolute construct and may be offset by the recognized right of the international community to respond to threats to peace and security. The diplomatic lobbying must predictably focus on outreach to the permanent members of the UN Security Council, to other key US allies and partners such as Germany, Japan, and India, and to opinion-leading countries in the Arab and Muslim world like Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The basic message should stress that: 1)
Iraq's pursuit of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, represents a hazard to security in the Middle East, and potentially to global stability; 2) the US will not rush to judgment on a resort to military force, but will wait and assess whether an inspection regime will work in disarming Iraq; 3) the US and the international community must preserve the option of using force to compel Iraq's compliance. Indeed, the credible threat of force may be the most effective tool in securing Iraqi cooperation and in obviating the need to actually use force.
Simultaneously, the US should intensify efforts at the UN to pass a Security Council Given the primary aim of constraining Hussein's quest for a nuclear capability, how does the military instrument best serve this policy end? Essentially, the US should posture itself militarily to maximize Hussein's doubts about Washington's ultimate intentions, lending credibility to claims that the US might occupy Iraq with ground forces. The US could accomplish this goal by continuing to: 1) move staff elements to Kuwait and Qatar; 2) improve airfields and command centers in Qatar and Oman; 3) conduct a stepped-up schedule of exercises in the region; and 4) pre-position additional stockpiles of equipment and ammunition. The overriding purpose of these measures would be to signal the seriousness of US intentions and to strengthen the hand of the UN weapons inspectors by underscoring the potential costs of Iraqi obstructionism.
In the event that Hussein blocks UN disarmament efforts over the next twelve months, the US should, after securing passage of an enabling resolution from the UN, proceed with direct targeting of Iraqi WMD sites. Such targeting, while likely to generate some international protests, would enjoy political cover as a result of US restraint during the extended diplomatic phase and from the proportional and focused nature of the attacks. To accomplish this mission, the US should exploit its information superiority, maneuver dominance, and precision engagement capabilities to launch a combination of cruise missile, and stealth aircraft attacks against suspected WMD locations. To maximize the effectiveness of such attacks, the US would need to launch a coordinated air campaign in advance of the WMD strikes to destroy Hussein's air defense assets --command and control links, radar sites, and missile launchers --as well as the remnants of Hussein's air force to establish US air supremacy over Iraq.
In extremis, if the full effectiveness of this air campaign cannot be confirmed, the US should consider quick, hard-hitting tactical raids on critical WMD sites to collect data and complete demolition of partially destroyed sites. Such raids, while putting US military personnel at risk, could heighten Hussein's uncertainty without directly threatening his existence. Army Rangers accompanied by specialists who have expertise in WMD matters could perform these missions. These forces could take off from Kuwait and conduct helicopter air assaults or tactical airdrops onto the objectives if the physical layout of the WMD sites and disposition of Iraqi forces was favorable. Alternatively, US forces could seize or establish an airhead in the desert west of Baghdad and launch missions against WMD sites from that secure base. Attempts by Iraqi armored forces to attack this staging base would be the greatest potential threat, but this risk could be minimized by simultaneously communicating to the Iraqis that the US will not target Iraqi military forces directly unless they move against the US staging area. If the Iraqis attack anyway, then US air supremacy should be used to devastate these forces, which would be easy targets as they approach the US position in the open terrain of the desert.
The insertion of US ground forces in even a limited operation within Iraq, as described above, is not desirable because it puts a significant number of US personnel within reach of Hussein's forces and narrows the margin of error for the operation. In addition, selective raids could be difficult for Hussein to distinguish from the opening stages of a fullscale invasion and therefore could prompt him to take drastic measures to counter the US presence on his soil, such as launching SCUD missiles with chemical or biological payloads.
The best course would remain an air campaign supplemented by detailed feedback on the effectiveness of the strikes. Overall, invasion is a morass that would leave the US open to charges of overextension and misidentification of vital interests. It is difficult to identify circumstances under which the supposed benefits of an invasion would outweigh the costs, risks, and damage to US relations and reputation globally. Cooperation with al Qaeda or threats to employ nuclear weapons would be potential candidate scenarios for an all-out US response, but the case for the former has not been made conclusively and the case for the latter is a hypothetical one without the time urgency or sense of imminent danger necessary to galvanize the world community or US public opinion to endorse a full-scale invasion.
CONCLUSION
The global terrorist threat against the US has understandably colored the lens through which American leaders view international relations, leading to a focus on common interests with a wide array of countries -Russia, China, India, Pakistan -and a discounting of still significant differences with those countries. Conversely, US conceptions of other countries with past terrorist associations unrelated to al Qaeda, such as Iraq, have taken on a sinister new dimension. The decision to move against Iraq seems to partly reflect a quest by US decision makers to consolidate the spectrum of threats confronting them. First, in conflating the distinct challenge of Iraq with the global terrorist network, US officials are able to claim progress in the war on terrorism while tightening the screws on America's longstanding nemesis in Iraq. This is especially important when victories against the elusive al Qaeda network are painfully slow, difficult to quantify, and not easily translated into dramatic media images for the public. Second, cautious monitoring of serious but latent international threats in the wake of 9/11 is a luxury that US leaders are not willing to indulge. In this sense, eliminating Hussein would hopefully remove an unpredictable variable from the US security equation and thereby simplify the challenges that threaten US vital interests.
The argument presented in this paper asserts that Iraq is a threat, but primarily a threat to regional stability that can be contained with coercive diplomacy and the measured application of force if Iraq fails to cooperate with demands from the US and international community to discard its WMD. Iraq's regional focus and personality-driven agenda do not seem to create sufficient motive for Hussein to combine efforts with global terrorism. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq is a more realistic and troubling concern, but should also be manageable with diplomacy and a targeted resort to force when necessary. The temptation to invade a weakened Iraq would not simplify US security concerns, but would saddle the US with a long-term occupation and nation-building responsibility, drain precious resources from the more pressing war on terrorism, and damage US relations with a host of countries worldwide. Perversely, the unintended consequences of a full-scale military operation against Iraq would multiply the challenges to the US, not reduce them. The US does not presently have the luxury of pursuing military endeavors against idiosyncratic despots who can be contained by other means. Instead, the US needs to marshal its resources and apply them against the global terrorist network that poses the overriding threat to US security and survival for the foreseeable future.
